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Executive Summary 
Only Ukraine’s civilian and military leadership can determine the best course of action that would meet Ukraine’s appropriate role to play 
in securing the Black Sea region (BSR).  By analyzing Ukraine’s precarious security environment and assessing the current security 
situation in the Black Sea, this paper first sought to identify a prototype for Ukraine’s role in the BSR.  However, the result of this search 
was a clear realization of Ukraine’s unique situation.  Ukraine is a nation with divisionary demographics, external pressures on internal 
politics, mixed ideas over economic opportunities and priorities existing in a neighborhood of states with competing influences and 
capabilities. 
Considerations:  For the purposes of this study, we narrowed the scope of the BSR to the littoral nations with a Black Sea coastline. 
Since these nations enjoy relatively unlimited access to the maritime shipping lanes of the Black Sea, limiting the BSR to these littoral 
states allowed our research to focus on the nations that most directly impact the maritime security of the BSR.  In determining Ukraine’s 
potential role in the region, we considered various characteristics of Ukraine’sgeography, economyand defense forces. Concerning issues 
of defense, we analyzed Ukraine’s defense spending, current and projected defense capabilities, andadvantages within Ukraine’s domestic 
defense industry. However,Ukraine’s economic capacity limits its potential roles in BSR securitization. 
Objectives:The goals of securitization should be to enhance Ukraine’s state capacity, inhibit military dominance in the BSR, and counter 
threats to regional stability. To avoid economic and security marginalization in an increasingly dynamic environment, Ukraine should 
assume a more active role in BSR securitization through a multilateral approach that would promote increased cooperation among littoral 
states in the region. 
Recommendations: It is difficult for Ukraine to meet the objectives set forth by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense with the defense 
budget merely representing roughly 1 % of Ukraine’s GDP.  Ukraine needs to increase its military budget to develop the levels and types of 
military capabilities required to play a greater security role in the BSR.  Therefore, greater defense spending is requisite to enhance 
Ukraine’s peacekeeping capabilities and rapid reaction forces.  Additionally, Ukraine should shift its funding to prioritize enhancing littoral 
maritime capabilities, specifically for patrolling its near-shore and safeguarding its ports and infrastructure.  Finally, Ukraine should 
demonstrate its current military capacity and willingness to apply military capabilities to regional security cooperation by increasing its 
participation in joint, multinational exercises. 
Assessment of Ukraine’s Security Environment 
The Black Sea Region (BSR) is in a period of transition and development.  States’ borders are fluid, economies are developing 
and governments are transitioning from Soviet relics to democratic regimes.  Throughout this period uncertainties are high, 
the political equilibrium is fragile and the status quo is negotiable.  As states compete to accrue and exert power in the region, 
Ukrainian ambitions and designs on their own role in the Black Sea are largely unknown.  This paper discusses Ukraine’s 
current military posture as well as Ukraine’s potential to influence the BSR security environment. 
Defining the Black Sea Region 
Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott argue that the BSR is the “next frontier in transatlantic strategic thinking in terms of 
energy security, trade, migration and other key policy areas.”1 Encompassing the BSR is a heterogeneous group of littoral 
states with deeply vested interests and competing foreign policy objectives. Figure 1 below shows an accurate depiction of the 
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in security operations to build military capacity, avoid marginalization and inhibit political domination in the BSR.  Ukraine 
should help maintain regional balance to prevent the domination of a singular state.  This balance will promote peace and 
security in the BSR.   
Until recently, the Ukrainian military suffered through a state of steady decline in overall capabilities since the break-up of the 
Soviet Union.  The priorities of the Ukrainian military are shown in Figure 2 below.  The Ukrainian Navy, currently 
headquartered in Sevastopol, consists of approximately 15,000 sailors and officers.2 According to the Ukrainian Ministry of 
Defense, “the Navy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is aimed to defend sovereignty and state interests of Ukraine in the sea, 
neutralizing naval groups of the enemy in its operational zone alone and in accordance with other military services of the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine, assistance to the Army of Ukraine in its sea directions.”  The tasks of the Ukrainian Navy include: 
• creation and maintaining of the combat powers on the level, sufficient to detain sea aggression;  
• neutralization of the enemy naval forces;  
• destruction of enemy transportation;  
• support in landing of amphibious forces and fight against enemy amphibious forces;  
• maintaining of beneficial operational regime in the operational zone;  
• defense of its bases, sea communications;  
• protection of submarine space within the territorial sea;  
• protection of merchant fleet, sea oil and gas industry and other state activity in the sea;  
• assistance to the Army in their conduct of operations (military actions) at sea directions;  
• participation in peacekeeping operations. 3 
 
FIGURE 2: Projection for Ukraine’s Development of Armed Forces, 2006-2011 
 
 
 
Source of information: BBC Monitoring Kieve Unit. http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?_session=85b3aacc-fb2c-11df-861d-
00008a0c5a50.1.1.890470.0.0.0&_state=&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVV&_md5=40416e133316b87bafecdd85c52d2b74 
 
Ukraine recently began rebuilding naval power in the Black Sea. In 2009, the Ternopyl took part in Operation Allied Endeavor in 
which it conducted NATO-led maritime security operations in the Mediterranean Sea.4 In 2010, Russia and Ukraine agreed to 
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resume joint naval exercises.  However, Ukraine’s land forces remain the largest benefactors of defense spending.  Stunted 
spending on the Ukrainian Navy is a distinct disadvantage to the Black Sea’s maritime security. 
Ukraine benefits from key advantages in defense force modernization.  Antonov is a Ukrainian company operating as a 
domestic supplier of aerospace technology.  During the Soviet Era, the aircraft firm was responsible for the majority of the 
Soviet Union’s heavy-lift capabilities including the An-124 and the world’s largest cargo plane, the An-225. Ukraine’s legacy of 
providing sophisticated missile technology to the Soviet Union enables the nation to continue developing its guidance systems 
applicable to both civilian satellite launches and defense purposes. The Ukrainian defense industry successfully developed, 
tested and fielded a domestic main battle tank, the T-84.  Ukraine is also developing advanced communication systems for use 
onboard surface ships and submarines.  These military achievements were only possible through investments in research and 
development, enabling the continuation and advancement of Ukraine’s military establishment left behind by the Soviet Union.  
During the presidency of Viktor Yuschenko, Ukraine openly pursued integration into western institutions, with particular 
fixation on NATO membership.  This push for integration induced dramatic increases in the level of modernization and 
standardization of Ukraine’s military, as well as an increase in NATO-led, multi-national security operations.  From these 
security operations, Poland particularly emerged over the past decade as a strong ally in Ukrainian military development.  In 
addition to deployments to Kosovo, Ukrainian soldiers served in Iraq under the command of Polish forces and played a critical 
role in combating insurgents while demonstrating their effectiveness at multi-national contingency deployments.  
In 2009, the policy pendulum swung back to toward Moscow with the election of Viktor Yanukovich.  While Yanukovich’s election 
does not preclude Ukrainian cooperation with NATO, President Yanukovich considers that the current level of Ukrainian—NATO 
cooperation will sufficiently address Ukraine’s concerns while preserving Ukraine’s flexibility to pursue its own security 
interests.  Ukraine’s status as a NATO Partner for Peace is vital to strengthening ties to Europe and the United States without 
provoking unnecessary discord with the Russian Federation.  Ukraine is continuing efforts to maintain such an appropriate 
level of partnership with NATO through joint exercises with other littoral states and anti-terrorism, maritime exercise in the 
Mediterranean and Black Seas. 
Remaining unbiased is neither tantamount to regional disengagement nor to a disinclination to cooperation with the competing 
powers.  Rather, striking delicate neutrality between states and institutions requires that Ukraine buttress its sovereign right 
to make foreign policy decisions to selectively engage with powers free from foreign pressures.  Ukraine can enhance its 
capacity to avoid unwanted influences by developing the military institutions that attract investment and cooperation with 
foreign nations.  Namely, Ukraine should pursue civilian control of a voluntary professional military corps, technical capability 
modernization, and military interoperability with other states.   Through these initiatives, Ukraine will bolster its strategic 
significance in the BSR as a beacon of sovereignty and stability to other nations.    
Russia 
The Russian Federation possesses the largest military capabilities of any of the Black Sea littoral nations.  Russia’s Black Sea 
Fleet, stationed in Sevastopol currently possesses over forty warships, a total of 167 vessels and approximately 24,000 sailors 
assigned to several different harbors within the peninsula.5  The facilities used by the fleet can accommodate nearly four 
hundred vessels.  The current flagship of the fleet is the guided-missile cruiser— theMoskva.   
The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s precedence in the region dates to the end of the 18th Century. As an armed naval flotilla, the Black 
Sea Feet commands a significant respect among the maritime services of Russia and the former Soviet Republics.  For over 
two hundred years, the Black Sea Fleet secured the southern coasts and protected the regional interests of the Russian 
Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.  Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Sevastopol remains the Black Sea 
Ukraine’s Military Role in the Black Sea Region 
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Fleet’s homeport. Over the past two decades, the fleet conducted numerous joint exercises with Turkey and the maritime 
security forces of the BSR’s other littoral nations such as BlackSeaFOR and Black Sea Harmony.6The Black Sea Fleet currently 
has two key tasks: “to control the Black Sea and ensure the safety of Russia's southern borders, and deploy to the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean as needed. If it is to be able to fulfill the former task, the fleet needs combat-ready 
missile boats, corvettes, small submarines as well as aircraft and coastal forces, including marines. The latter task can be 
assigned only to long-range sea and ocean-faring groups, such as frigates accompanied by support ships”.7 In addition to 
maritime security operations in the Black Sea, the fleet in Sevastopol is critical to maintain a Russian naval presence in the 
Mediterranean, where NATO is currently conducting anti-terrorism and anti-piracy operations.   
During the 2008 conflict in Georgia, Russia deployed the missile cruiser Mirage off the Georgian coast.  This deployment was a 
clear display of Russia maritime strength, demonstrated by the fleet potential to project naval power against other BSR littoral 
states. Ukraine responded to the Mirage’s deployment with new requirements for Russian naval vessels to obtain permission 
before entering or leaving Ukrainian territorial waters.  Following the hostilities in Georgia however, the Russian flotilla 
returned to Sevastopol unchallenged.  
The Black Sea Fleet will add several new frigates to its flotilla beginning in 2013.8  By 2020, the fleet intends to add fifteen new 
combat ships and diesel-electric submarines based on a new initiative announced by the Russian Navy in 2010.9  Despite the 
plans to upgrade the fleet, the need to modernize and replace the aging fleet remains the biggest challenge for Russian 
domination of the Black Sea.  The cost of modernization greatly impacts these efforts.  Instead of scrapping older ships in 
favor of new vessels, the Russian Navy favors to reduce costs by equipping the current fleet with upgraded weapons and 
communication systems.  According to reports, “The renewal of the Black Sea Fleet will be financed under the state 
rearmament program for 2010-2020, which is still being drafted. Officers of the Russian Defense Ministry say that its bottom-
line funding, 13 trillion rubles ($419 billion), will not cover the modernization of the Navy, particularly such large groups as the 
Northern and Pacific Fleets, which require larger groups of more powerful and expensive warships than either the Black Sea 
or the Baltic Fleets”.10 In addition to fleet modernization investments, a substantial amount of upgrades are required to the 
existing infrastructure in Sevastopol.  The port currently needs repairs, as do other infrastructures required to fuel and 
service the ships.  
Ukraine simplified the Black Sea Fleet’s mission to continue maritime security operations with an agreement to extend 
Sevastopol leasing arrangement with the Russian Navy.11In addition to the naval facilities, Russia may station over 160 combat 
aircraft at airfields on the peninsula.  This agreement marks a new level of cooperation between the two nations, providing 
Ukraine access to Russian gas supplies and incentivizing the Russian Defense Ministry to make long-term improvements to the 
port in Sevastopol.  In return, Russia assists Ukrainian efforts to complete the Slava class guided-missile cruiser— the 
Ukraina—  that has been under construction for over 25 years.  
The Russian-Georgia conflict in August of 2008 clearly demonstrated that Russia maintains the offensive capabilities 
necessary to conduct cross-border ground operations against neighboring nations.  If the result of the 2008 conflict is an 
accurate measure of Russian capabilities and intentions, Russia’s operational capability outstands its suffering economy.  
There are an estimated 1,700 Russian soldiers stationed in Abkhazia.12  Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia enabled Russia to 
extend its influence south along the eastern coast of the Black Sea.  Agreements between Russia and the breakaway republic 
could lead to stationing several thousand more Russian troops in the region.  In 2009, the Russian Ministry of Defense ruled 
out future joint operations with Georgia in light of the 2008 conflict.  
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Turkey 
Turkey is among the most economically and politically stable nations in the BSR.  Turkey is a powerful balance to an ever-
encroaching Russia in the BSR.  Turkey encourages cooperation and stability in the region through its vigilant defense of the 
straits leading into the sea, joint military exercises on the sea, and participation in regional agreements designed to bring 
stability through economic measures.13  Turkey often partners with Russia, offering the country the same opportunities as 
other nations to contribute to BSR securitization.  Integrating all members of the BSR and fostering a non-threatening 
environment to facilitate collaboration strategically ensures Turkey’s cooperation and potency in the BSR community.   
Turkey’s security interests include not only the neighboring BSR nations, but also its Middle Eastern neighbors to the south, its 
relationship with NATO and its role as a balancing force between Russia and the West.  Because of its strong economic position, 
NATO membership and EU partnership, Turkey holds a unique position of leadership within the region.  Despite its ties to the 
Western security arrangements, Turkey encourages regional cooperation agreements aimed at keeping the BSR littoral states 
independently responsible for their security.  As Turkey controls the only entrance into the Black Sea and is powerful enough to 
remain out of the sphere of Russian influence, it is to Turkey’s strategic advantage to keep the BSR politically neutral.   
Turkey benefits from complete control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits leading into the Black Sea.  The 1930 Montreux 
Convention guarantees Turkish the control of the Straits.14 The convention allows Turkey to limit the military presence of 
nations in the BSR.  Turkey’s ability to regulate foreign military presence in the Black Sea was tested as recently as the 
Russian-Georgian war of 2008, when the US attempted to send humanitarian supplies through the Straits.  Turkey denied the 
US access to the Black Sea through the Straits, emphasizing the Turkish government’s long held position that the BSR should 
be free from influence of powers foreign to the region.15 
Turkey’s self-assumed role as guarantor of Black Sea security may position Turkey to use its regional influence as a 
springboard to enhance its global influence. Turkey has a vested interested in warding off foreign powers pushing for Black 
Sea access to ensure Turkish influence over the Straits in the event of a BSR crisis.  Turkey argues that it’s NATO membership 
alone renders NATO military assets in the Black Sea superfluous.  Furthermore, the process of amending the Montreaux 
Convention to allow NATO and the US access to the Black Sea is prohibitively complicated.16  As a corollary, Turkey cooperates 
with NATO outside of the Black Sea region.  
In order to encourage regional stability, Turkey uses naval communication programs.  In 2001, six Black Sea countries formed 
the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group comprised of Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia.17  All states 
act together to promote collaboration on search and rescue operations, cleaning sea mines, environmental protection and 
organizing goodwill visits between nations.  All nations gather annually to discuss operations to improve communication.   
After September 11th, the world focused on combating terrorism.  The Black Sea Region was no exception.  In an attempt to 
protect the Black Sea from terrorist threats, Turkey initiated a regional maritime security effort in 2004.  Through this 
agreement, ships identify and track potentially illegal activity throughout the Black Sea.18  Despite Turkey’s invitation to all 
littoral states to join Black Sea Harmony and protect the region from new and emerging threats, only Russian and Ukraine 
signed the security arrangement. 
An important feature of the aforementioned operations is neutrality.   No agreement or operation is designed to threaten 
another state; instead, the goal is to expand cooperation to benefit BSR states.   Turkey remains committed to maintaining “the 
good levels of cooperation between the littorals in the Black Sea.”19 Because of this commitment to neutrality, the littoral 
states generally do not perceive Turkey as a threat and are more willing to participate in regional cooperatives.   It is 
important to note that Turkey remains a model for the rest of the littoral states in terms of becoming a NATO member by not 
Ukraine’s Military Role in the Black Sea Region 
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allowing its military actions to be defined by other NATO members.   Turkey remains an independent state and will continue to 
pursue actions that are in its best interest.   Encouraging security and stability among the littoral states is crucial to Turkey’s 
status as a leader in the region.    
The Turkish military has undergone modernization since the break-up of the Soviet Union.  The four military branches are the 
Turkish Armed Forces, Turkish Land Forces, Turkish Naval Forces, and the Turkish Air Force.20  After 1994, military forces were 
reduced to less than 400,000 troops.21 Turkish forces’ new strategy “emphasizes the ability to perform a variety of missions, 
move forces rapidly from one region to another, and mount firepower sufficient to meet any foreseeable threat”.22  Turkey also 
partnered with the United States and Germany to purchase more modern technical equipment such as tanks, F-16s, and 
submarines.23 The Turkish military has been active in international operations, leading NATO security forces in Afghanistan and 
partnering with NATO and the UN on naval operations.24 
While Turkey’s military is reducing its size and increasing efficiency by partnering with international organizations, it is also 
concerned with regional conflicts that do not affect the BSR.  Turkey’s concerns with Cyprus and the southern Kurdish region 
remain.25  Concerning Cyprus, lasting contention between Turkey and the international community remain over the sovereignty 
of the Turkish occupied territory on the island.  Kurdish rebels in the south represent a political and a military threat.  The 
Kurdish rebel threat is even more pertinent as Turkish military forces contemplate moving operations into northern Iraq.26  
Regardless of the size of the threat, the Turkish military engaged outside the BSR and may prioritize these threats over BSR 
securitization.  
NATO 
NATO’s principal strategic political interest in the Black Sea Region is to preserve the integrity of the Atlantic Charter.  Of the 
littoral Black Sea states Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are signatories of the Atlantic Charter.  Under Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Charter, the political and military security of these littoral states factors into the calculation of all NATO member 
states’ security individually and the Alliance’s security collectively.   Subsequently, a security threat to any one of these states 
constitutes an existential threat to the Alliance.  Therefore, NATO’s political strategic interest in the Black Sea is to offset 
security threats to Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey that would otherwise test member states’ “collective security” commitments 
and the Alliance’s solidarity.  
Defining security threats is a contentious business for states and even more so for organizations such as NATO.  Anne Aldis 
and Graeme Herd distinguish between “narrow” and “wider” security assessments.   A “narrow” security assessment only 
considers “hard” military threats to state survival.  A “wider” security assessment extends security objectives to ensure state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, taking into consideration “soft” threats that include “corruption; criminal groups; private 
militias; insecure borders; smuggling and trafficking in weapons, drugs, contraband and people; illegal migration; proliferation 
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD); environmental scarcity (for example, access to fresh 
water or cropland), and, of course, terrorism”.27  BSR is prone to both hard and soft threats.  
Leonid Polyakov contends that hard and soft threats run along a continuum and are not mutually exclusive in class or 
territory.28 Soft threats may escalate into hard threats just as threats to one state may spill over into another state.  For 
example, the social unrest in Georgia hastened Russian invasion, creating a Ukrainian “security dilemma” by increasingly 
disposing Ukraine to Russian pressure.  Thus, NATO’s immediate concern with “hard” threats against Bulgaria, Romania and 
Turkey make it a permanent political influence in the Black Sea Region.  Yet, assessing and offsetting “soft” threats to NATO 
members’ relatively insecure neighbors are major preoccupations of NATO’s military assets in the region.  
Ukraine’s Military Role in the Black Sea Region 
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Sergei Glebov maintains that Ukraine factors into the “soft” threat calculations of the West given its proximity to the West’s 
“value space” demarcated by NATO member states.29 Yet, since Ukraine is not a NATO member, the construct for NATO-
Ukrainian cooperation is the “Charter on A Distinctive Partnership” originally signed in 1995 by both parties and renewed in 
1997.  This Charter created the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) that produced an Annual National Programme (ANP) in 2009 
to guide the application of military investments in the region according to NATO and Ukrainian priorities.30The fact that only one 
of the ANP’s five chapters concerns “security issues” and that this chapter is separate from the chapter on “defense and 
military issues” quite blatantly puts the Ukraine on the map for a “wider” NATO assessment of soft security threats. NATO 
operates through the Ukraine Defense Documentation Office (NUDDO), the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence 
Reform (JWGDR), NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Civil and Democratic Control of the Intelligence Sector towards the 
security aims of these chapters. The remaining three chapters on “political and economic issues,” “resources” and “legal 
issues” are more broadly designed to buttress Ukrainian security against the soft threats to its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.31 
Many of NATO’s military operations with the Ukraine exist under the auspices of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiatives 
to develop Ukraine’s nascent military institutions. First, Ukraine cooperates with NATO’s Planning and Review Process (PARP) 
designed to promote interoperability between NATO and PfP states by participating in simulation exercises at the Joint 
Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany. Additionally, Ukraine participates in the 
Partnership Coordination Cell in at NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium that focuses 
on training countries for “peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and search and rescue”.  Third, the YavorivPfP Training 
Center in Ukraine hosts NATO PfP simulations for Joint Assistance Exercises intended to prepare the PfP states for emergency 
situations that may pose major threats to the region such as hazardous chemical outbreaks. Finally, Ukraine participates in the 
NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that allows NATO to operate within Ukraine primarily for commercial transit facilities 
to its endeavors in Iraq.32 
The United States of America 
The United States’ interests in the BSR assumed a more significant role since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  
During the Cold War, the US viewed the BSR as a battleground for proxy wars against the Soviet Union.  This idea lingered until 
the events of September 11th shifted terrorism into global consciousness.  At that time, the BSR became increasing important to 
the US and joined what the US terms the “Greater Middle East”.33 
The BSR holds special significance to the US for three reasons.34 First, the BSR connects Europe to China, the current 
challenger to US hegemony.35 Second, the Black Sea serves as a bridge to the Middle East, a region that is of special note to 
the US since September 11, 2001. Third, the Black Sea connects continental Europe with its main energy supplier, Russia.  This 
serves to mitigate Middle Eastern energy cartels’ power in determining global energy prices.36 
To serve its interests in the region, the US facilitates NATO cooperation with non-NATO states such as Ukraine via offering 
training in security affairs.37  According to Deborah Sanders, since the Orange Revolution of 2004, Ukraine has taken steps to 
become “highly skilled, rapidly deployable, [capable of using] advances in technology and communications, and [toward 
possessing] the versatility to operate across the full spectrum of military operations from high intensity to peacekeeping.”38 
To support Ukraine’s military development efforts, the United States participates in bilateral exercises, such as the US-Ukraine 
Bilateral Defense Consultations.  These bi-annual conversations cover general defense topics.39  According to Army Lt. Col. 
Gary D. Espinas of the US Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, facilitating interactions between the US and 
Ukraine “…underscores the importance of having a professional military that is interoperable with NATO and capable of 
meeting their country's needs…Ukraine is [also] a key partner of the United States and a key player in regional security”.40 
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The US National Guard and the Ukrainian military participate in the exchange of personnel for tactical trainings in emergency 
management and anti-terrorism.  In the past, Ukrainian forces joined the Guard in California for disaster response exercises.  
Likewise, members of the California Guard traveled to Ukraine for joint anti-terrorism trainings.41  Such exercises serve a dual 
purpose to develop Ukraine’s stand-alone capabilities as well as enhance Ukraine interoperability with NATO troops. 
Additionally, the US reinforces ties with NATO member states Romania and Bulgaria by facilitating joint training between 
Romanian, Bulgarian, and US troops in exercises relevant to the US mission in that region.42  In pursuit of this goal, the US 
Army Europe Task Force-East currently hosts training opportunities in Bulgaria via the US European Command’s Theater 
Security Cooperation Program.43 Under this program, the Army Corps of Engineers is currently constructing the Novo Selo 
Training Area scheduled for completion in 2012.44  This facility will offer trainings in preparation for future possible NATO joint 
operations, as well as to reinforce relationships with non-NATO allies in the region.45 
In Romania, the US military also seeks to create ties with partner nations by constructing training facilities and lending its 
expertise in intelligence training. The US Marines Corps also collaborate with Romania via the Black Sea Rotational Force.46 This 
100-member marine-air-ground task force seeks to create lasting ties to the BSR, Caucasus and Balkan states through 
enhancing force development in NATO and non-NATO partnering nations.47 
Finally, the US intelligence community also collaborates with its Romanian counterparts via “information sharing, mutual 
support [both financial and procurement], visits, and joint training.” 48 US agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA), 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Secret Service communicate with Romania in 
bilateral and multilateral formats resulting from, “common preoccupations, needs and perceptions, as well as shared 
threats.49  In addition to providing information and support, the FBI opened an organized crime-focused office in Bucharest in 
2001.50 
Recommendations for Ukraine’s Role In BSR Securitization 
To cope with BSR security threats, Ukraine should strategically engage in security operations to build military capacity, avoid 
marginalization and inhibit political domination in the BSR.  Ukraine should strategically participate with institutions through 
exercises that enhance Ukrainian security capabilities and sovereignty without upsetting the political interests of the 
competing regional powers.  Certain aspects separate strategic engagement from haphazard interaction with various 
institutions and regional powers.  First, Ukraine must be purposeful about what the intended gains of engagement are.  Second, 
they must be prudent about with whom and when they engage, constantly reassessing the means of engagement and matching 
these means to their desired end.  Finally, they must take inventory of their resource sufficiencies and deficiencies applicable 
to their cause.  Thus strategic engagement requires that Ukraine define its role in the region, measure its actual and potential 
capacity as a player in the region, and interact with other institutions to make up the difference between actual and potential 
capabilities.  
Ukraine’s Political Role  
The sovereign states surrounding the Black Sea have diverse political realities. Aydin, et. al  argue that “democracy in the 
[Black Sea] region is still influenced by the heritage of Communism,” and that the littoral states have little experience 
implementing the essential ingredients of democracy, such as “organizing effective party structures and formulating 
appropriate electoral platforms, and [building] consensus”.51 While this struggle between East and West may characterize the 
region as a whole, effective regional cooperation necessitates knowledge of each state’s unique identity and its position on the 
political spectrum between Communism and democracy.  
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While the citizens of Ukraine are diverse in religion, language, and customs, the country is relatively peaceful and ethno-
political conflict is rare.52 However, the country is somewhat politically divided in terms of its relationship with Russia.  
Ukraine’s geographic location serves to separate Russia from the European Union (EU) and provides a reference point for the 
country’s political division.  While Ukrainians in the west identify with Western Europe and its institutions, the Ukrainians in the 
east maintain close relations with Russia and claim Russian as their first language.  This cultural and linguistic divide manifests 
in difficulty reaching consensus on foreign policy and domestic issues.53 
Western development models have long influenced Turkey in its move from Islamic society toward secularization.54  Turkey’s 
successin efforts to transform its institutions based on European standards isunique for the region.  In recent years, Turkey 
has edited over one-third of its constitution and implemented over two hundred new laws on issues such as “modernization of 
the penal code, the protection of freedom of expression, religious pluralism, and human rights”.55  Additionally, the government 
implemented reforms aimed at inclusion of the Kurdish population into mainstream Turkish society under the “More freedom 
for All” campaign.56  The campaign’s most notable provision allows freedom in operation of Kurdish radio and television news 
networks. Even with these improvements, much internal debate still exists over the role of the nation and the move toward 
secularism, and its securitization.57 
Bulgaria and Romania are emerging from their communist pasts through state-building, democratic reforms, and European 
Union membership.58  Each state has had a mixed record since joining the EU.  In Bulgaria, the rise of populist movements has 
created a politically volatile environment, as witnessed in the protests and street marches during the summer of 2009.59  In 
recent years, citizens have been more actively protesting perceived corruption and inefficiency in the Bulgarian government.  
Surprisingly, the Bulgarian political arena’s unsettled environment has not improved since the country gained EU 
membership.60 
Romania’s political results vary similar to Bulgaria. Shortly after joining the EU, conflict between the country’s Prime Minister 
and President inhibited democratic reforms and shifted the country’s focus to infighting between its two heads of state.61 This 
conflict led to division within Romania’s ruling party.  According to the European Commission, the Romanian presidential 
election of December 2009 demonstrates Romania’s mixed record on democratic reforms.  While the peaceful election 
demonstrates the country’s move toward the democratic norm of openness and transparency, inflammatory campaign tactics 
employed by both major parties represent deficiencies in the current political culture.62 
Since its war with Russia during the summer of 2008, Georgia has been reluctant to voice its Western sentiments.63Since 
President Saakashvili took office in 2004, the country has been working toward four specific goals: democratization, 
institutionalizing a market economy, state building, and nation building.64 Georgia barely rebounded from the government’s 
forceful reprimand of a protest march on Tbilisi when the country went to war with Russia in the summer of 2008. Georgia 
currently exists in a state of flux: reluctant to demonstrate its adherence to EU democratic norms, yet clearly seeking to 
escape from Russia’s influence.  This leaves Georgia facing a precarious political climate as well as slow economic growth and 
low foreign investment.65 
Yet, since the fall of the Soviet Union, various attempts to increase regional cooperation in the BSR have slowly progressed. 
This slow progression has been attributed to several factors, including “the low level of interest of Black Sea countries for 
regional affairs, prickly bilateral relations between some of them, and Russia’s policies in the region”.66  In more recent years 
however, key events in the wider region including the ‘color revolutions’ in Ukraine and Georgia, EU and NATO’s 2004 expansion, 
and the landmark European Neighbourhood Policy of 2006 establish the pressing need for regional political cooperation among 
Black Sea littoral states.67 
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Regional cooperation between the BSR states complements cooperation with the EU. The littoral states’ location at the 
crossroads between East and West necessitates maintaining stable relations Russia while partnering with the EU. The BSR 
states should focus on building consensus separate from Eastern and Western powers.  
Regional initiatives have existed in the BSR since the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation initiative (BSEC) in 1992.  
In June 2010, The Commission on the Black Sea published an 2020 vision for progress in the BSR declaring that a “civil society 
initiative comprising a number of current and former policy-makers, scholars and practitioners both from within the region 
and from outside”.68  The Commission offers specific recommendations for increasing regional political dialogue in the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperative initiative (BSEC). 
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation initiative is approaching its twentieth anniversary in 2012. The Commission on the Black 
Sea views this approaching anniversary as an inspiration for increasing awareness and as an impetus for increased dialogue 
between the BSR states and to reform the BSEC to be a “more relevant organization with greater clout”.69 
The Council makes several recommendations for the BSEC, including “setting specific targets and deadlines for the 
development of a system of legally binding commitments and implementation mechanisms”.70 These benchmark goals should 
address areas of shared concern between BSEC members.  By working towards regional coordination with other BSEC 
members, states benefit from synergies otherwise precluded by a unilateral policymaking approach.71 
The Council also recommends that the BSEC “[agree] on substantial augmentation of [its] budget, based on proportional 
contributions, in order to enable BSEC to co-finance major projects of regional interest”.72Specifically, the Commission 
recommends that the BSEC act in concert with the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank to fashion action-specific funds 
similar to the Hellenic Development Fund.73 
Ukraine’s Economic Role 
Ukraine’s economy has experienced much volatility since declaring independence from the Soviet Union.  First, due to heavy 
economic reliance on providing agricultural goods to the Soviet Union, its economy collapsed with that of the USSR in 1991.  
However, Ukraine’s glimmer of economic hope is in steel production.  Through Ukraine’s first decade of independence, steel 
grew to be its top export.  In 2007, Ukraine’s real GDP exceeded 7%, predominantly merging from elevated international steel 
prices.  The price increase was driven by international states, such as Russia, other CIS markets and Asia with high domestic 
demands for this good.  When the global financial crisis distressed these regions, the Ukrainian economy suffered from the 
external loss in steel exports.  
Second, given the volatile markets on which Ukraine’s economy is based, it continues to rely on Russia as its main energy 
provider.  As an example, Ukraine ensured low gas prices in a deal to extend the Russian Black Sea Fleet lease at 
Sevastopol.74Russian oil and natural gas account for an alarming 75%.75  This heavy external reliance leaves Ukraine’s 
economy vulnerable to outside shocks.  In 2006, Russia doubled the price of gas.  The Ukrainian government refused to pay the 
increased amount.  As a corollary, the Russian government turned off the flow of gas throughout the year.  The periodic gas 
cut-offs led to a sharp decline in Ukraine’s GDP.  Ukraine continues to demonstrate its political and economic reliance on 
Russia to keep its economy stable, as any attempt to break from Russia would negatively impact the Ukrainian people.   
Ukraine’s economy is also affected by its massive debt.  In 2008 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) granted Ukraine a $16.4 
billion loan to bolster its finances in the midst of the global economic crisis.76  As a condition for the IMF loan, Ukraine 
committed to progressively depreciate its currency, recapitalize its banking sector, and pursue more rigorous fiscal and 
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monetary policies.77Volatility and uncertainty within and outside Ukraine’s borders continue to hamper its efforts for economic 
recovery.  The IMF loan has had little impact for the Ukrainian economy as real GDP continued to fall 20.3% in 2009.  The 
country’s economic raises concerns over whether Ukraine will pay back its loans.  As a result, many international banks 
stopped making loans in Ukraine and even stopped giving depositors their money back.  Ukraine currently has more than 
enough reserves to service its sovereign debt of about $18 billion. However, total foreign debt of Ukraine’s corporations 
(mainly banks) is five times larger than the sovereign debt.  If banks collapse, the state will not have enough cash to take over 
the obligations of the banking sector. 
Given this negative economic situation, Ukraine’s government will find financing military growth difficult.  However, there are 
significant areas where Ukraine can simultaneously gain economic as well as military advantages within Ukraine’s thriving 
industrial military complex.  GlobalSecurity.org points out that “the military-industrial complex of Ukraine is the most advanced 
and developed branch of the state's sector of economy.”78  Ukraine has advantages in the aerospace, shipbuilding, and arms 
industries.  Through its advantage in steel production as well, Ukraine is uniquely poised to not only be a leader in military 
industrial production, but also a technological weapons leader.  Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia placed a large 
portion of its military industrial complex within Ukraine.  Since 1991, Ukraine seeks to decrease negative Russian industrial 
influences while focusing on building a self-reliable military industrial complex. 
Largely, this plan has been successful and is worth further pursuit.  In 2009, Ukraine signed an arms deal with Iraq worth 
US$2.4 Billion.79  This deal places Ukraine in the top 5 of arms dealers in the world.80 In 2008, though, Ukraine experienced a 
decline in arms trading.  Given its significant capabilities, Ukraine should continue to pursue the policy of greater arms trading.  
This will help the Ukrainian economy become less reliant on the agricultural and commodities sectors while encouraging its 
own military benefits from the investments in arms research and development.  
Ukraine’s Military Role 
There are three main areas of integration with other Black Sea nations; economic, political, and military.  Ukraine is currently 
involved in economic agreements and political organizations designed to increase communication between littoral states.  
However, these agreements in themselves do not equip Ukraine with the tools to become a major actor in BSR securitization.  
Ukraine risks marginalization by avoiding both Russian and NATO influence.   Currently, Ukraine’s state capacity can only 
secure its own territory and interestswith Russian, NATO or Turkish aid.   
Ukraine faces significant obstacles to engagement in the BSR.  While the ideal situation would be for Ukraine to build its 
military capacity, financial constraints hinder long term strategies that focus on growth.  Currently, Ukraine spends less than 3 
percent of GDP on its military while the other major actors, Turkey and Russia, spend significantly more.81Figure 3 below shows 
Ukraine’s military spending compared to the rest of the littoral nations.  While Ukraine does not spend much on the military, the 
government has committed to building a specialized military through its partnership with NATO.  The Ukraine-NATO military 
cooperation plan for 2009-2010 included the following goals: 
• “transition to capabilities-based defense planning system; 
• enhancement of operational capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces; 
• professionalization of Ukrainian Armed Forces.”82 
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FIGURE 3: Defense Spending in the Black Sea Region 
 
Source of Data: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
Also, allowing Russia to continue its large presence in Sevastopol demonstrates that Russia is still the largest actor in the 
region.  If Ukraine wishes to balance this force outside of the NATO umbrella encompassing Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria, it 
needs to exert its military presence at a level comparable to Russia.  Ukraine does not need to directly counter the Black Sea 
Fleet, but should demonstrate that the presence of the fleet does not dictate Ukrainian military policy.  Ukraine can even 
demonstrate military power peacefully through major cooperation on initiatives designed to counter illegal activities such as 
Black Sea For and Black Sea Harmony.  Working through these areas of cooperation, Ukraine can reassure its regional 
neighbors that it is a strong actor, maintaining stability in the area.   
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was left with a fragmented military system.83The nation has worked diligently to 
overcome difficulties of the Soviet era and is now in a position to strengthen the military structures that exist, expand its 
military exports, and become more than just a regional actor by partnering with NATO and Russia outside the BSR.  In order to 
achieve the goal of becoming a stable guarantor of security for regional allies, Ukraine needs to invest more in its military 
structure.  It faces considerable risks in pursuing this strategy, however being able to ensure security and stability without 
joining NATO or other regional security organizations should be worth it to a nation that sits in the middle of three competing 
powers; Russia, Turkey, and NATO.   
The benefits of becoming a regional military actor are abundant.  Ukraine relies heavily on Russia for a steady supply of 
energy, and at a significantly discounted price.  When Russia decides to turn off the gas supply, the Ukrainian people suffer.  
With new gas pipes leading to Europe being built south of the Black Sea, the rest of Europe will have less interest in protecting 
Ukraine should such an event happen.  Since as any political disturbance could leave Ukraine vulnerable to Russian aggression, 
Russia’s heavy military presence is also a source of contention for the nation.  Ukraine needs to build up a military presence to 
not only protect itself should Russia decide to act aggressively, but also to demonstrate to area nations that Ukraine is an 
important ally so that an alternative energy agreement might be considered.   
If Ukraine decides to build its military capacity, however, it faces diplomatic consequences mainly from Russia.  In order to 
best protect itself, Ukraine should make military investments in peaceful areas, such as Black Sea security cooperation.  It can 
also partner with Russian troops as well as NATO forces to train and increase cooperation to decrease the risk of 
confrontation.  The risks of investment in the military are minimal and do not outweigh the benefits to building and improving 
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capacity.  In fact, through successive administrations, nationalism and a strong Ukrainian state is an idea around which most 
Ukrainians might eventually rally.  
As compared to other regions of the world, the BSR is a relatively stable environment in terms of maritime-related security 
threats.  Yet, all nations in the BSR, including Ukraine, should consider existing vulnerabilities and continue to address security 
challenges impacting economic stability and prosperity.  At the end of the Cold War era, nations in the BSR enjoyed largely 
peaceful relations with neighbors due to the emergence of former Warsaw Pact nations and former Soviet republics as strong, 
independent states.  While most security experts view the overall risk of high-intensity, conventional conflict between any 
combinations of littoral nations as low, the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August of 2008 demonstrates that the 
region is not immune to the risk of interstate conflict.  Thus, if Ukraine is to be a legitimate peacekeeping actor in the BSR it 
must develop the tools to facilitate multilateral security operations with other nations in the region.  As demonstrated in Figure 
4 on the following page, there are many other forces willing to offer security, however these forces can often be biased in 
their assistance.  It is essential that Ukraine remain flexible.  In addition to maintaining peacekeeping forces, Ukraine must 
enhance its ability to counter asymmetric threats against both civilian and military targets.  
 
FIGURE 4: Distribution of Armed Forces in the Black Sea Region 
Source: 
http://media.photobucket.com/image/black%20sea%20military/dutchintell/Image-BlackSeaMilitary-001.jpg 
Unlike many nations in the greater Middle East and Central Asia where religious extremism fuels violence against the 
government, separatist movements in the Caucasus region represent the greatest threat to governance, security and 
economic prosperity.  Such separatist movements could seek to attack critical infrastructure such as ports, public 
transportation and energy infrastructure.  The goal of such attacks is to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the government to 
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provide security or the most basic utilities to the population (in the case of power generation and water treatment facilities).  
Separatist groups often seek to provoke a heavy-handed response from their own domestic security forces such as curfews, 
travel restrictions, detentions and searches or seizures that violate the privacy of ordinary citizens.  The ultimate goal is to 
draw international support and possibly intervention by other nations.  South Ossetia’s separatist strategies provide a clear 
example of a successful movement to establish sovereignty from Georgia.  Regardless of the impetus behind an organization’s 
actions, the impact of such attacks on governments, economic activity and the civilian populace can be extremely detrimental 
to long term stability and prosperity.  While Ukraine may not be directly threatened, the risk of small-scale conflicts spreading 
violence across borders could severely impair the availability of regional security cooperation to counter other threats. 
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Maintaining security in today’s complex environment requires a significant investment in training for peacekeeping operations 
as well the capability to rapidly deploy those forces.  While 2009 may be the “Year of the Land Forces”, air and naval forces 
cannot be ignored.84 Ukraine must develop a rapid reaction force capable of deployment throughout the Black Sea to conduct 
humanitarian assistance operations and to prevent violence from escalating.  Heavy-lift cargo aircraft to deploy both 
personnel and equipment is a critical requirement.  Defense planners must determine how many troops (and for what 
duration) will be required to handle specific types of contingency operations while balancing realistic expectations of what 
Ukraine can achieve in the near term.  Figure 5 on the previous page illustrates the low levels Ukrainian participation in 
peacekeeping operations around the world.  
Ukraine must simultaneously increase its ability to conduct routine security operations and to protect critical economic 
infrastructure in the region. As an increasing amount of energy sources in the Caspian Region are discovered and exploited, 
the need to safeguard these assets from terrorist attacks becomes vital to Ukraine’s economic viability. While the relatively 
homogenous Ukrainian population provides a less than ideal environment for an extremist group to find safe haven or recruit, 
today’s sophisticated terrorist cells possess a global reach.  No nation should consider itself invulnerable to this threat. 
Ukrainian security forces must dedicate the assets necessary to conduct security operations such as near-shore patrols of 
port facilities and routine surveillance of refineries. Emphasis must be placed on enhancing the Ukraine’s maritime capabilities 
to ensure security of off-shore platforms and shipping lanes. Routine search operations targeting container ships and smaller 
vessels alike are essential to combat the illicit drug trade and human trafficking. To the extent that organized crime is 
complicit in these activities, additional pressure by internal security forces is required to disrupt the logistical and financial 
architecture of these organizations.  
To facilitate this sophisticated security initiative, resources should be dedicated to training exercises. Cooperation with 
international security partners is paramount.  In addition to advocating for increased regional cooperation on security issues, 
Ukraine should continue to appeal for assistance from outside nations to enhance its own domestic capabilities. The United 
States’ Joint Multi-National Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany provides an example of the type of sophisticated training 
facilities required to prepare units for deployment. Ukraine must seek opportunities for joint, multi-national training exercises 
at home and abroad.  As noted in Figure 6 on the following page, Ukraine hosted five multination exercises in 2009, less than a 
hundred personnel deployed as a part of multinational exercises outside of Ukraine, further highlighting Ukraine’s failure to 
demonstrate a willingness to cooperate in security exercises beyond its own borders.85  Ukraine should further enhance its 
own domestic training facilities to better train and equip units preparing to deploy to peacekeeping and other contingency 
operations.86 
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Conclusions 
The Black Sea Region faces considerable threats moving forward in the 21st century. Ukraine must evaluate its security needs 
to develop standards suitable for transforming into an active security partner in the region. Reliant on Russian gas, yet 
independently one of the largest arms traders in the world, Ukraine is powerful.  However, as regional states and international 
security organizations such as NATO seek to exert increasing influence in the BSR, non-NATO states such as Ukraine could be 
marginalized. Let there be no mistake, Ukraine is threatened by is geopolitical position between Russia and NATO as well as by 
its proximity to Turkey. The BSR needs a viable and capable partner in Ukraine to prevent any further assertions of dominance 
by any one littoral nation.Ukrainians democratically elected a government committed to abandoning a bid for NATO while 
strengthening Ukrainian political, economic and military influence.  Without permanent security arrangements such as NATO, 
Ukraine must develop the state capacity to provide for its own security before it can be a significant actor in the BSR.  
Ukraine’s military has the potential to assume a leadership role in Black Sea securitization by increasing military investments 
and engaging in multilateral operations to enhance Ukraine’s military visibility and interoperability.  If Ukraine adopts these 
recommendations, it may become a modicum for other BSR littoral states to develop the foreign policy tools to become a 
contributing actor in BSR securitization.  
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